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On 22 January 1999, the Eleventh General Re-
view of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
quotas came into force, after a number of members
holding a majority of not less than 85 per cent of
votes expressed their consent to the proposed cap-
ital increase — hence fulfilling the participation re-
quirement. The Eleventh General Review of
Quotas had been concluded on 30 January 1998,
when the IMF Board of Governors adopted the
resolution submitted by the Executive Board pro-
posing a 45 per cent increase to the overall amount
of quotas in the institution — which rose to
around SDR 212 billion (USD 299 billion(1)). As re-
gards Portugal, its quota is now SDR 867.4 million
(USD 1,223 million), reflecting a SDR 309.8 million
(USD 436.8 million) increase.
In what concerns to the distribution of the over-
all increase in the quota, and reflecting the views
expressed by the Interim Committee(2) in April
and September 1997, it was agreed that:
i) 75 per cent of the overall increase would be
equiproportionally distributed (i. e., as a propor-
tion of each member’s previous quota); ii) 15 per
cent would be distributed in proportion to mem-
bers’ shares in calculated quotas (based on 1994
data), so as to better reflect their relative economic
positions; and iii) the remaining 10 per cent would
be allocated to the correction of the main anoma-
lies affecting the quota structure. Regarding the
latter amount, 90 per cent would be distributed by
the countries holding a share in calculated quotas
greater than their share in actual quotas, while the
other 10 per cent would be distributed among five
members whose current quotas are far out of line
with their relative economic positions.
The conclusion of the Eleventh General Review
of Quotas is particularly important given the tur-
bulence affecting the international monetary sys-
tem over the last years. The massive financial
packages approved recently, following the diffi-
culties experienced by the emerging markets of
Southeast Asia and Latin America furnished the
IMF with improved international visibility. How-
ever, the strong utilisation of financial resources
resulted in a significant weakening of the institu-
tion’s liquidity. With the approval of the quota in-
crease — its major source of funds — the IMF sees
its liquidity position strengthened, at a time when
the institution’s role in the face of challenges of a
new international financial framework is under in-
tense discussion.
This article starts by presenting the main func-
tions played by the IMF quotas, as well as the sev-
eral general reviews, to the present time (section
2). I then follow to analyse the procedures of de-
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(1) The values presented in US dollars assume a 1 SDR= 1.41 USD
exchange rate (31 December 1998).
(2) I. e., the forum where IMF members meet (usually twice a
year, in Spring — in Washington — and in Autumn — in the
town receiving the Annual Assembly) to discuss issues of a
monetary-exchange rate nature. This body —created in 1974—
is composed by 24 central bank Governors or Ministers, and
has mere advisory functions.termination of individual quotas and the key role
played in this process by the so-called calculated
quotas (section 3). Finally, section 4 discusses the
essential issues around the Eleventh General Re-
view of Quotas: size and distribution of the overall
increase; subscription and major implications over
the structure of quotas.
2. QUOTAS: FUNCTIONS AND REVIEWS
A member’s quota is the most fundamental ele-
ment in its financial and organizational relations
with the IMF; in parallel, the quotas also represent
the IMF’s financial base. Each member is assigned
a quota, expressed in Special Drawing Rights
(SDR)(3), equivalent to the amount of the institu-
tion’s capital subscribed by each member. Before
the approval of the Eleventh General Review of
Quotas, the IMF capital amounted to SDR 146 bil-
lion (USD 205.9 billion)(4); the quota of Portugal
was of SDR 557.6 million (USD 786.2 million).
In addition to the determination of each mem-
ber’s contribution to the IMF’s capital, quotas
perform three other major roles:
1) The maximum of access to the IMF finan-
cial resources is expressed in terms of quo-
tas. In the context of regular facilities, each
member can currently use resources of the
IMF up to the maximum limit of 300 per
cent of its quota. This limit does not apply to
special facilities. This is the case of the Sup-
plemental Reserve Facility, approved in De-
cember 1997 in the context of the agreement
with Korea, where the limit of access is a
function of each member’s individual needs.
2) In accordance with the Articles of Agree-
ment, the rates at which SDR allocations are
made are expressed as percentages of quotas
established on the date of each decision to
allocate. Decisions regarding SDR attribu-
tions are taken in successive basic periods,
with a maximum duration of five years.
Over the course of the first basic period
(1970-72) SDR 9.3 billion were allocated. A
new SDR allocation (of 12.1 billion) was car-
ried out only in the third basic period, which
took place between 1978 and 1981. Portugal
became member of the SDR Department in
July 1975, receiving SDR 53.32 million (20.7
per cent of its quota at the time) under the
allocation carried out in the third basic pe-
riod(5).
3) Finally, the amount of the quota determines
a member´s voting power in the IMF. Each
member holds 250 basic votes, to which one
vote for each SDR 100,000 quota is added.
The number of votes of each member deter-
mines, for instance, its representation in the
IMF Executive Board — the permanent deci-
sion making accountable for the manage-
ment of general operations of the IMF, and
for the exercise of powers delegated to it by
the Board of Governors. In fact, five out of a
total of 24 Executive Directors are appointed
by the five members holding the largest
number of votes — the United States, Japan,
Germany, France and the United Kingdom.
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(3) Special Drawing Rights are international reserve assets created
by the IMF in the sequence of the First Amendment to Articles
in 1969, and are attributed by the IMF to the members partici-
pating in the SDR Department. Since 1981 the value of the SDR
is calculated on a daily basis, based on a basket comprising the
five leading international currencies: the US dollar, the yen, the
Deutsche mark, the French franc and the Pound sterling. On 1
January 1999, the amounts in Deutsche marks and in francs in-
cluded in the SDR basket were substituted by an equivalent
amount in euro, using the fixed conversion rates.
(4) In practice, the capacity of IMF to financially assist its members
is lower than the institution’s total capital. This is also because
members pay 75 per cent of their quota in the corresponding
national currency — which seldom is demanded outside the is-
suing territory. The stock of resources available to the IMF —
normally reaching less than half its capital — encompasses the
SDR assets of the institution, national currencies of members
considered by the Executive Board to have a sound balance of
payments positions (i.e., bound to be included in the quarterly
Operational Budget), as well as the amounts not employed in
the credit facilities activated in the context of the GAB/NAB
(see section 4.1 for a more detailed explanation). Note that as-
sets in gold are written-off from the stock of usable resources,
as their inclusion in the financial operations of the IMF requires
the prior approval by a majority of 85 per cent of total votes.
(5) In September 1997, the Board of Governors of the IMF ap-
proved a proposal of the Executive Board for amending the
IMF’s Articles of Agreement to allow for a special one-time al-
location of SDRs so as to equalize members’ ratios of cumula-
tive allocations to their Ninth Review quotas at approximately
29.32 per cent This decision shall imply the doubling of the to-
tal amount of SDR attributed (to SDR 42.87 billion) and the fix-
ing of the ratios between the attributed SDR and the individual
quotas at a value equal for all members (about 29.3 per cent).
For Portugal, the SDR cummulative allocation shall increase
about SDR 110 million, to SDR 163.46 million.The other 19 are elected by the remaining
countries. The constituency to which Portu-
gal currently belongs includes also Italy —
which indicated the Executive Director —
Greece, Malta, Albania and San Marino.
It should be noted that the importance attrib-
uted by each member to the functions performed
by quotas closely depends on its level of economic
development. Although the increase in voting
power is important for all members, developing
countries tend to consider the amount of their
quota specially as the basis over which the limits
of their access to IMF resources and SDR alloca-
tions are determined. In turn, for developed coun-
tries more emphasis is given to quotas as provid-
ing a basis for determining contributions to IMF
resources. A balanced and equitable quota system
should meet the different perceptions of members
as regards the various functions quotas perform.
Under the Articles of Agreement the Board of
Governors is required to conduct a general review
of quotas at intervals no longer than five years. If
appropriate, it shall also propose its adjustment to
adequate the institution’s capital to the financial
needs resulting from changes undergone by the
world economy(6). A general review of quotas also
enables re-adjustments to individual quotas, so
that these may better reflect member’s relative eco-
nomic positions. The First General Review of
Quotas was concluded in 1951 (table 1).
3. THE KEY ROLE OF CALCULATED QUOTAS
As mentioned above, the Articles of Agreement
provide for a general review and possible adjust-
ment of quotas every five years. However, they do
not indicate how IMF quotas should be deter-
mined and the Executive Board has neither for-
mally adopted nor endorsed any particular
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Table 1





Quota of Portugal after each
General Revision
In SDR million (%)
First General Revision ............... 1951
Second General Revision............. 1956
Extraordinary ...................... 1959 60.7
Third General Revision .............. 1960 60.0
(a)
Fourth General Revision ............. 1965 30.7 75.0 25.0
Fifth General Revision ............... 1970 35.4 117.0 56.0
Sixth General Revision............... 1975/76 33.6 172.0 47.0
Seventh General Revision ............ 1978 50.9 258.0 50.0
Eighth General Revision ............. 1983 47.5 376.6 46.0
Ninth General Revision.............. 1990 50.0 557.6 48.1
Tenth General Revision .............. 1994 557.6
Eleventh General Revision ........... 1998 45.0 867.4 55.6
Note:The values up to the Fourth General Revision are expressed in million US dollars.
(a) Quota of Portugal at the date of its adhesion to the IMF (29 March 1961). The subscribed quota — accounting for 0.4 per cent of total capi-
tal — granted Portugal with 850 votes — 0.49 per cent of voting power. As regards representation in the Executive Board, Portugal was
integrated in the same constituency of Italy (2,950 votes) — who indicated the Executive Director — Spain (1,750 votes) and Greece (850
votes). Finally, it was agreed that the initial parity of the escudo vis-à-vis the US dollar and gold would be 28.75 per USD and 1,006.25
per troy ounce, respectively.
(6) It should be noted that an 85 per cent majority of votes is re-
quired if the IMF’s overall quota amount is to be subject to any
change. In addition, a members quota shall not be changed
without its expressed consent, and without the corresponding
settlement.method for determining quotas. To overcome this
situation, the IMF has developed and put into
force a set of formulae to obtain a synthetic indica-
tor aiming to reflect the relative economic size of
each member — the so-called calculated quotas.
Since 1963 — when the Bretton Woods original
formula was first revised and several alternative
formulae were developed — calculated quotas
have played a central role in the distribution of the
selective component of overall quota increases
(i.e., the component that envisages to adjust the
size of each member’s quota to its relative eco-
nomic position(7)). The current formulae employed
in the determination of calculated quotas have
been into force since the Eighth General Review
(see Box 1).
From the Fifth to the Seventh General Reviews,
the distribution of the selective component was
made proportionaly to the (positive) difference be-
tween calculated and actual quotas. This technique
— named Method B since the Ninth General Re-
view — distributed the selective component by a
limited number of members only. Over the course
of the Eighth and Ninth General Reviews, the dis-
tribution of the selective component was propor-
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FORMULAS OF CALCULATION OF QUOTAS USED IN THE ELEVENTH GENERAL REVIEW
Reduced Bretton-Woods: (0.01Y+0.025R+0.05P+0.2276VC)(1+C/Y
Scheme III: (0.0065Y+0.0205125R+0.078P+0.4052VC)(1+C/Y)
Coefficient of adjustment: 0.850369
Scheme IV: (0.0045Y+0.03896768R+0.07P+0.76976VC)(1+C/Y)
Coefficient of adjustment: 0.827708
Scheme M4: : 0.005Y+0.042280464R+0.044(P+C)+0.8352VC
Coefficient of adjustment: 0.904555
Scheme M7: 0.0045Y+0.05281008R+0.039(P+C)+1.0432VC
Coefficient of adjustment: 0.908865
Variables used have the following meaning:
Y - GDP at constant prices of 1994.
R - Annual average of reserves in gold and foreign currency, including assets in SDR and ECU, and reserve po-
sitions in the IMF.
P - Annual average of current payments (goods, services, income and unrequited transfers) in the period
1990-1994.
C - Annual average of current revenue (goods, services, income and unrequited transfers) in the period
1990-1994.
VC - Variability of current revenue, defined as the standard deviation of the 5-year moving average, centred on
the third year, for the period 1982-1994.
The calculated quota is the highest value among the result reached through the Bretton-Woods formula and the
average of the two lowest values yielded by the remaining four formulae. The latter are previously adjusted or "nor-
malised" so that the sum of the calculated quotas for all members equals that derived from the Bretton-Woods for-
mula.
(7) The way the quota increase is distributed depends on a set of
factors, which includes the size of the overall increase to be dis-
tributed; the existing quota structure and the relative dispari-
ties in quotas among members; and the need to provide
sufficient liquidity for the IMF to maintain its operations with-
out undue reliance on borrowing. Up to the Eighth General Re-
view of Quotas, the equiproportional component of the
distribution was predominant, chiefly due to the non-existence
of strong disparities between actual and calculated quotas, and
the need to avoid severe perturbations to the voting structure.
During the Eighth and Ninth General Reviews, the share of the
selective component was respectively of 60 and 40 per cent,
leading to a substantial change in the IMF quotas structure.
Some Executive Directors support that a quota structure that
better reflects the relative economic position of members tends
to strengthen liquidity of the IMF, since members exhibiting
wider discrepancies between the calculated and actual quota
shares are those which have presented relatively fast growth
and solid external positions.tional to the share of each member’s quota — the
so-called Method A. This method has the advan-
tage of being simpler and more transparent, and is
applicable to all members. Appendix 1 describes
methods A and B in further detail.
4. THE ELEVENTH GENERAL REVIEW OF
QUOTAS
4.1 Size of the overall quota increase
The proposal adopted by the Board of Gover-
nors implied a 45 per cent increase in the overall
amount of quotas, which rises from SDR 146.2
billion to SDR 212.0 billion.
The determination of the overall quota increase
takes several factors into account. Some of these
are: the growth of trade and international pay-
ments since the previous review; the size of the
world economy; the scale of potential payments
imbalances — including those due to sudden in-
versions in capital flows — and the role of private
markets in financing those imbalances.
In this context, the assessment of IMF’s liquid-
ity position stands as a fundamental issue. As re-
ferred above, the IMF capacity to financially assist
its members is lower than the total capital of the
institution, and depends on the stock of usable as-
sets (SDR assets, national currencies of the mem-
bers with solid external positions and contracted
loans)(8). The stock of assets should be confronted
with the expected demand for IMF resources in a
defined time span. This demand results from the
need IMF has to (i) meet commitments ensured in
the context of the existing facilities; (ii) meet the
debt service contracted by the institution itself; (iii)
attend to some members’ will to draw their re-
serve positions fully or in part; (iv) and finally, to
establish new financing agreements.
The liquidity ratio is a measure of the IMF’s li-
quidity position, represented by the ratio of its
uncommited usable resources to its net liabilities.
Table 2 describes the process of calculation of the
liquidity ratio.
The unprecedent size of commitments under
arragements in response to the Asian financial cri-
sis led to a pronounced weakening in the IMF li-
quidity position since the last review. Between
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Table 2
CALCULATION OF THE LIQUIDITY RATIO
In SDR 10
9, excepting mentions otherwise; end-of-period
1996 1997 1998
1. Total resources............................... 149.0 149.2 165.1
Members’ currencies......................... 143.4 144.7 149.4
Gold holding ............................... 3 . 6 3 . 6 3 . 6
SDR holdings ............................... 1 . 7 0 . 6 0 . 7
Other assets ................................ 0 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 3
Available under GAB activation............... - - 11.1
2. Non-usable resources ......................... 87.9 98.5 111.6
3. Usable resources (1-2)......................... 61.1 50.7 53.5
4. Amount committed under arrangements ........ 9 . 7 18.0 24.5
5. Working balances ............................ 11.9 10.0 9.6
6. Net uncommited usable resources (3-4-5) ....... 39.5 22.7 19.4
7. Reserve tranche positions...................... 38.0 47.1 56.4
8. Outstanding borrowing under GAB ............ - - 4 . 3
9. Net liabilities (7+8) ........................... 38.0 47.1 60.7
10. Liquidity ratio (6/9x100) ..................... 103.9 48.2 32.0
Source: International Monetary Fund.
(8) About 67 per cent of the overall quota increase approved in the
Eleventh General Review of Quotas (SDR 44 billion) consists of
usable resources.July 1997 and the end of 1998, the amount of com-
mitments exceeded SDR 43 billion. In this context,
the agreements celebrated with Thailand (on 20
August 1997), Indonesia (5 November 1997), Korea
(4 December 1997) and Brazil (2 December 1998)
should be highlighted. These four agreements
amounted to SDR 36 billion. In the same period,
the value of resources decreased from SDR 58 bil-
lion to SDR 53.5 billion. These events resulted in a
sharp decline of the liquidity ratio, from 126.3 to
32.0 per cent in the same period — a historically
low level (chart 1) — reducing substantially IMF’s
ability to meet further commitments.
In this context, the New Arrangements to Bor-
row (NAB) — which came into force on 17 No-
vember 1998 — played a central role. The NAB,
adopted by the Board of Governors on 27 January
1997, consist of credit facilities agreed between the
IMF and 25 members (or the respective central
banks), with the purpose of strengthening the re-
sources of the institution in exceptional situations
of shortage of funds(9). The NAB were first acti-
vated on 2 December 1998, following to the agree-
ment celebrated between the IMF and Brazil.
4.2 Distribution of the overall increase
Following to the Executive Borad decision, 75
per cent of the total increase was distributed
equiproportionally — i.e., taking into account the
share of each member’s actual quotas. For Portu-
gal, the equiproportional quota increase amounted
to SDR 188.2 million:
Rate of growth of the overall quota = 45%.
Share of the equiproportional component
= 75% of the overall increase.
Quota = SDR 557.6 million.
Equiproportional increase = 0.45 X 0.75 X 557.6=
=188.2
To adjust the quota structure to the relative eco-
nomic position of members, 15 per cent of the
overall increase were distributed in proportion to
members’ shares in calculated quotas (based on
1994 data), using Method A. This method requires
the prior determination of the amount and the
share of each member’s calculated quota. In the
Portuguese case, according to data available up to
1994, the calculated quota amounts to SDR 3,049.0
million (0.56 per cent of total quota). Thus, the se-
lective quota increase for Portugal was of SDR 55.2
million:
Overall increase = SDR 65,800 million.
Share of the selective quota = 15% of the
overall increase.
Share of the calculated quota = 0.56%.
Selective increase = 65,800x 0.15 x 0.0056 = 55.2.
Finally, the remaining 10 per cent of the overall
increase (about SDR 6,500 million) was distributed
as to correct the major anomalies in the current
quota structure (ad hoc increase). 90 per cent of this
increase was distributed by members (37) for
which the share of the respective calculated quota
was not smaller than the share of its actual quota;
the remaining 10 per cent were distributed by the
five members whose quotas were far out of line
with their relative economic positions and that
were simultaneously participants in the NAB —
Singapore, Luxembourg, Korea, Thailand and Ma-
laysia. The ad hoc quota increase for Portugal
equalled SDR 66.4 million. Appendix 2 presents
the respective calculations.
























































































(9) The NAB do not replace the former General Arrangements to
Borrow (GAB), which are still in force. However, the NAB
shall be the main and first mechanism to which countries will
resort if needed. The combined amount of resources available
in the context of NAB and GAB amounts to SDR 34 billion
(USD 47.6 billion).
Source: International Monetary Fund.The new quota for Portugal is thus SDR 867.4
million, resulting from a SDR 309.8 million in-
crease. It should be noted that, since the previous
quota structure underestimated the relative eco-
nomic size of Portugal, the individual quota in-
crease amounted to about 56 per cent, i.e. above
the overall increase (45 per cent).
4.3 Subscription and reserve tranche position
The IMF agreement provides that, after the
quota increase comes into force, members shall
pay the IMF, within an agreed period, 25 per cent
of their increase in SDR or in any other currency to
be defined by the institution — this is the so-called
reserve asset payment. The balance of the increase
shall be paid in national currency, usually through
the issuing of non-negotiable non-interest bearing
notes in favour of the IMF(10). The reserve asset
payment does not affect each member’s overall
amount of external reserves, as the reduction of as-
sets in foreign currency is compensated by an in-
crease, of equal value, in its reserve position in the
IMF. In accordance with the 30-working day pe-
riod agreed in the context of the Eleventh General
Review of Quotas, Portugal proceeded to the pay-
ment of its quota increase in early February 1999.
Each member’s reserve tranche position (pre-
viously known as the “gold tranche”) consists of
the difference between its quota and the IMF’s
holdings in its respective national currency, ex-
cluding the amount resulting from loans granted
by the IMF to that member. Drawings made under
the reserve tranche are not considered an use of
IMF credit as each member’s reserve positions are
a part of their foreign reserves. Request for reserve
tranche purchases shall not be subject to challange
(Article V, section 3(c)).
Every quarter, the IMF pays a return to those
members holding a remunerated reserve tranche
position. A reserve tranche position is remuner-
ated when a member’s amount of national cur-
rency held by the IMF is lower than a
pre-determined “norm” (excluding currency held
by the country due to credits granted by the IMF
to the member). For each member, the norm
equals 75 per cent of the quota existing prior to the
Second Amendment to the Articles of the Agree-
ment (1 April 1978) plus all following quota in-
creases. Therefore, as the quota increases, the
norm converges to 100 per cent of the effective
quota — progressively reducing the share of the
non-remunerated component.
According to the data available in late 1998,
only a small part of the reserve position of Portu-
gal (about 6.6 per cent) is non-remunerated (table
3, diagram 1).
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Table 3
CALCULATION OF THE NORM AND THE REMUNERATED RESERVE TRANCHE FOR PORTUGAL
Position on 31 December 1998
SDR106 % of quota
1. Quota on 1/4/1978 ............................. 117.00 20.98
2. Quota on 31/12/1998 ........................... 557.60 100.00
3. 75 per cent of quota on 1/4/1978 ................. 87.75 15.74
4. Change in quota since 1/4/1978 .................. 440.60 79.02
5. Norm (3+4) .................................... 528.35 94.75
6. Holding of escudos (31/12/1998) ................. 115.50 20.71
7. Reserve tranche position (31/12/1998)............. 442.10 79.29
8. Remunerated reserve tranche position (5-6) ........ 412.85 74.04
Source: International Monetary Fund.
(10)In the terms of Decree-Law no. 245/89, which regulates the re-
lationship between Portugal and the IMF, “the Banco de Portu-
gal is enforced to carry out increases to the Portuguese quota in
the International Monetary Fund; for this purpose it shall make
on its own account the deliveries of special drawing rights, of
currencies of other members or of escudos”.4.4 Major changes to the quota structure
The Eleventh General Review of Quotas
yielded some important changes to the structure
of quotas and voting power in the IMF. Firstly,
worth noting are the significant increases in the
quotas of Japan and Germany (62 and 58 per cent,
respectively), which resulted in substantial rises in
these countries’ voting powers. Indeed, Japan be-
came the IMF member with the second largest
quota. The United States recorded a percentage
change below the overall increase (40 per cent,
compared with 45 per cent), recording a slight fall
in its share in total voting power. The Eleventh
General Review of Quotas also enabled some
members holding large quotas but that did not re-
flect their respective relative economic size, to ben-
efit from significant quota increases. This was the
case of Korea (104 per cent increase), Ireland (60
per cent), Spain (58 per cent) Austria (58 per cent)
and Italy (54 per cent), among others.
As regards the constituency where Portugal is
included, the overall quota increase amounted to
SDR 3,065 million (52.4 per cent), resulting in a 0.2
percentage points rise in the voting power share of
this group, to 4.2 per cent (table 4). Reflecting
these changes, Portugal became the country hold-
ing the second largest quota in the constituency.
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Diagram 1
REMUNERATED RESERVE TRANCHE POSITION













CHANGES TO THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF SOME MEMBERS
Amount of quota expressed in SDR 106
Ninth General Review of Quotas Eleventh General Review of Quotas
Quota Share (%) Votes Share (%) Quota Share (%) Votes Share (%)
1. United States .......... 26526.8 18.21 265 518 17.61 37149.3 17.52 371 743 17.16
2. Japan ................. 8241.5 5.66 82 665 5.48 13312.8 6.28 133 378 6.16
3. Germany .............. 8241.5 5.66 82 665 5.48 13008.2 6.14 130 332 6.02
4. France ................ 7414.6 5.09 74 396 4.93 10738.5 5.07 107 635 4.97
5. United Kingdom ....... 7414.6 5.09 74 396 4.93 10378.5 5.07 107 635 4.97
6. Italy .................. 4590.7 3.15 46 157 3.06 7055.5 3.33 70 805 3.27
7. Greece ................ 587.6 0.40 6 126 0.41 823.0 0.39 8 480 0.39
8. Portugal............... 557.6 0.38 5 826 0.39 867.4 0.41 8 924 0.41
9. Malta ................. 67.5 0.05 925 0.06 102.0 0.05 1 270 0.06
10. Albania .............. 35.3 0.02 603 0.04 48.7 0.02 737 0.03
11. San Marino ........... 10.0 0.01 350 0.02 17.0 0.01 420 0.02
12. Total (6 to 11) ......... 5848.7 4.00 59 987 3.98 8913.6 4.20 90 636 4.185. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The conclusion of the Eleventh General Review
of Quotas takes place in a context where the estab-
lishment of a new architecture for the international
monetary system became one of the most widely
discussed issues. The IMF’s capacity for assisting
financially its members with imbalances in their
balance of payments was substantially increased
with the endorsement of the Eleventh General Re-
view of Quotas and the NAB, strengthening the
central position of the IMF in the international
monetary system.
The world economy financial background is to-
day unquestionably different from that in 1945,
when the IMF Agreement was signed(11). The mon-
etary system based upon fixed parities against
gold and infrequent adjustments was replaced by
a greater exchange rate flexibility between the ma-
jor economic areas; the size of private capital flows
rose substantially; integration among countries in-
creased, through their greater openness — both to
trade and capital flows; finally, the IMF member-
ship expanded enourmously, granting the institu-
tion with an universal status — and simulta-
neously rising the potential demand for its re-
sources.
The financial instability affecting the interna-
tional markets in the 1990s offers the IMF possibly
its greatest challenge since the end of the
Bretton-Woods regime, in the early 1970s. The size
of repercussions of the recent turbulence in finan-
cial markets over the world economy makes ur-
gent the re-adaptation of the institution’s surveil-
lance practices, granting them with new dimen-
sions. For instance, the usual analysis of members’
economic policies should be supplemented with a
systematic and rigorous assessment of the sound-
ness of the financial sector. It is also important that
the recent trend towards greater information
transparency and availability is strengthened. This
comprises, for instance, indicators on the level of
short-term private external debt.
An effective surveillance by the IMF, which al-
lows for an early diagnosis of problems and their
advanced correction, should help to avoid or di-
minish the severity of both general disturbances to
the world economy and specific problems in indi-
vidual members that contribute to balance of pay-
ments difficulties, the likelihood of sudden and
massive adjustments in balances of payments, and
the potential demand for its financial resources.
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(11)The IMF was formerly founded in 1945, reflecting the consen-
sus reached one year before — during the Monetary and Fi-
nancial Conference held in Bretton Woods. The cornerstone
idea supporting the creation of the IMF was that the promo-
tion of international monetary co-operation would be the best
way to reach other objectives considered essential to the wel-
fare of the respective members. These objectives are listed in
Article I of the IMF Agreement.Appendix 1
METHODS OF DISTRIBUTION OF THE SELECTIVE QUOTA INCREASE
This Appendix describes the mathematical
properties of the alternative techniques for allocat-
ing quota increases presented in the main text and
introduces the concept of “adjustment coefficient”.
1. The adjustment coefficient
To ease the comparison between the alternative
distribution methods, it seemed useful to calculate
a measure of its effectiveness in reducing the di-
vergence between the shares in calculated quotas
and those in actual quotas. The adjustment coeffi-
cient, developed during the Eight General Review,
indicates precisely the amount of reduction in the
difference between the share in the calculated
quota and the share in the actual quota, as a per-
centage of the original difference. For each mem-




















i stand respectively for the sha-
re in the actual quota, the calculated quota and the
new quota. For the m IMF members as a whole,
























































This method allocates the selective component
of the quota increase to all members, as a propor-
tion of their shares in calculated quotas. The new
quota of member i, excluding the ad hoc compo-
nent of the increase, can be expressed as a function
of its effective and calculated quotas, as follows:









i are respectively the actual
quota, calculated quota and the new quota. Para-
meter a ³ 0 stands for the equiproportional quota
increase as a percentage of the actual quota, and s
defines the aggregate amount of the selective in-
creases ( D Q
s
i å ) as a proportion of total calculated
























































It can be demonstrated that the coefficient of















Equation (6) shows that the coefficient of ad-
justment varies inversely to the size of the
equiproportional component, and that its value is
limited by the overall quota increase. For example,
if the capital of IMF doubles, and the equipro-
portional component is null, the coefficient of ad-
justment equals 50 per cent.
3. Method B
This method distributes the selective compo-
nent of the quota increase among a restricted num-
ber of previously elected members. The selective
increase for elected member i is distributed as a
proportion of its share in the total excess of calcu-
lated quotas over actual quotas of all the eligible
members:







i =+ + - () ( ) 1 (7)
where d is the aggregate size of selective increases
in relation to the difference between the sum of
calculated quotas and the sum of effective quotas.
So,



































i =+ () 1 (9)
Three other techniques were analysed during
the Eleventh General Review alternatively to
methods A and B.
Appendix 2
AD HOC QUOTA INCREASES
Ad hoc quota increases are determined so that
the initial discrepancy between the ratio of the cal-
culated quota share to the effective quota share,
and a given pre-fixed value (F) is uniformly re-
duced for all selected countries. Algebraically, for



































i ,a n d stand respectively for the
shares in the calculated quota, the new quota and
the effective quota of member i. Sn
i is, in this case,
defined as the quota share of country i, conside-
ring only the ad hoc increase. Therefore, for a selec-
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where A indicates the total value of the ad hoc in-
crease.
Coefficient b in equation (1) is identical for all
selected countries, and is calculated iteratively to
ensure that the sum of individual increases match
a pre-determined amount. A further restriction
imposed on b is that it must not be greater than 1.
In the case of the current review, the ad hoc in-
crease is divided into two parts: 9 per cent of the
overall increase is distributed by the 37 members
with a calculated quota share not lower than the
respective actual quota share (F=1), and 1 per cent
by the five members with the highest ratios of the
calculated quota share to the effective quota share
and that simultaneously participate in the NAB —
Singapore, Luxemburg, Korea Thailand and Ma-
laysia.
For an ad hoc quota increase of SDR 6.5 billion,
calculated coefficient b is 0.226. Portugal, which
has a calculated quota share to the effective quota
share of 1.47, benefits from the first part of the in-
crease.
For Portugal, the variables in equations (1) and





























































û ú =´+= å 0004107 1462261 592216 6 .. . 2 4 8 .
with A= 146,226.1x0.45x0.09= 5,922.16. Since the
actual quota of Portugal is SDR 557.6 million, the
corresponding ad hoc increase amounts to SDR
67.2 million (SDR 624.8 million — SDR 557.6 milli-
on).
The values reached for the ad hoc increase were
adjusted so that these would not imply excessive
changes in the shares of new quotas. For Portugal,
full adjustment resulted in a SDR 0.8 million
downward review of its ad hoc increase, which
thus amounted to SDR 66.4 million.
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